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The recent trend in income per capita — effectively the contents of people’s 
wallets — is far below that in the decades that preceded it, and has fluctuated 
from year to year.1
The purpose of this chapter is to place the stagnation of Australian wages in 
the context of developments in other rich nations from the post-war period to 
today. We do this using internationally comparative data. We are interested in 
the relationships between wages, productivity, inequality and overall economic 
stability. By testing theories about the causes of wage stagnation based on the 
available data, it is possible to point to the policy levers most likely to reverse wage 
stagnation in Australia.
What explains wage stagnation?
Taking a global perspective on wage stagnation, we start by analysing the distribution 
of any country’s annual total output, which can be measured in several different 
ways.2 The value of the nation’s output is distributed between labour and capital. 
Most of any country’s population derives its annual income from labour-based 
sources like wages, superannuation and pensions, and remittances. Wage growth is 
therefore an essential component of the growth in overall living standards. 
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Capital incomes typically include rents, interest payments and capital gains 
from the sale of owned assets. Any household can have several sources of income 
at once. An individual household may have one person working full-time, another 
getting a pension, while another derives their income from renting a second 
property. Despite this complexity, it still makes sense to think of two distinct 
‘types’ of household: one that earns income primarily from work (which we will 
call labour), and one that derives income primarily from capital-based sources 
(which we will call capital).
The evolution of the share of labour income is shown in Figure 3.1 for Australia 
and G7 countries. Data come from the Penn World Tables (v. 9.0) and include the 
labour income of employees as well as the labour income of the self-employed.3 
For some early years, the series data are shown as essentially constant, so we include 
them in our chart.4 We can see there has been a secular shift in labour’s share of 
output across a number of rich countries. Australian workers took home roughly 
68% of total output in 1960. By 2017, that value was 52%. Both the numerator 
and the denominator of the ratio have risen rapidly, but the significance (in both 
relative and absolute terms) of the loss of value for workers is clear. Australia is not 
alone in this trend, but it constitutes an extreme example. 
The USA began the period with a lower labour share than Australia (around 
64%), and while the USA’s labour share has fallen, the decline has been smaller: 
around 5% over a 70-year period. Denmark’s labour share has remained roughly 
constant over this period, while Germany’s has fallen rapidly. The average of all rich 
countries’ labour share of output was 61% in 1960. By 2017, that value was 51%. 
The collapse in Australia’s labour share is remarkable, both for the trajectory 
it took, and the seemingly negligible effect it had on economic growth over a 
60- to 70-year period (since, as we know, Australia has an unmatched record of 
sustained expansion).5 
The problem can be stated quite simply. Real average weekly earnings are 
22% higher than they were in 1981. Labour productivity is 70% higher than it 
was in 1981. With productivity growing so much faster than real wages, workers’ 
share of total output must have fallen.
The key question is: what explains this fall in the value of economic product 
appropriated by workers, despite seemingly relentless economic growth? Three 
main answers are suggested by the literature, as summarised by Arsov and Evans, 
writing for the Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA):
Structurally lower employee bargaining power may also be depressing 
wage growth. Bargaining power is difficult to measure and may, in part, be 
determined by the labour market conditions themselves. Common proxies 
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suggest that bargaining power has shifted away from labour: unionisation rates 
have declined and labour markets have become more flexible across advanced 
economies. At the same time, automation, technological change, increasing 
global production integration and offshoring have affected some segments of 
the labour market.6 
Figure 3.1: Share of labour income of nominal national output
Source: Penn World Tables (version 9.0), using the ‘labsh’ variable; denominator is % of GDP. 
Constant lines indicate little variation rather than no data, and are included for completeness. 
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Answer 1: The existence of large, global firms and the influence of economic 
globalisation has caused a decline in the labour share everywhere. Autor and 
colleagues advance a theory of ‘superstar’ firms which outcompete other firms, 
increasing sectoral concentration. Using US data, they show that industries where 
concentration has risen most have seen the largest declines in the labour share.7 
Global integration is typically measured by trends in final goods trade, 
participation in global value chains and foreign direct investment. Using a panel 
of countries from 1980 to 2017, Doan and Wan show that export growth tends 
to depress the wage share, while import growth increases it.8 In other words, 
globalisation is bad for at least some kinds of lower-skilled domestic worker. Their 
findings echo Milanovic’s thesis9 that increasing global inequality is the result of 
large-scale changes in behaviour by the market as allocator of capital. 
Technological change also forces the labour share lower. Essentially, 
information and communication technologies combine with robotics to remove 
jobs via automation. Autor and colleagues estimate that half of the decline in labour 
shares across the developed world resulted from a combination of rapid progress in 
information and telecommunication, and a high share of occupations that could 
be easily automated.10 Technology, in this view, is the enemy of workers’ progress.
Globalisation’s contribution to the fall in the labour share is estimated at 
about half of that of the impact of technology. Young and Tackett examine the 
experience of 125 countries over a 40-year period.11 The decline in labour shares in 
advanced OECD economies has been particularly steep for middle-skilled labour, 
and far less so for high-skilled labour. One of the main hypotheses is that recent 
technological change is biased towards replacing labour in routine tasks.12 Routine-
biased technology has taken over many of the tasks performed by these workers, 
contributing to job polarisation between high-skilled and low-skilled occupations. 
Adler and colleagues point to a global slowdown in productivity taking place since 
the end of the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) of 2007-09.13 Australia, as a very 
open economy, is caught in this global trend. In this context, wage stagnation is 
understood less as a feature of the domestic policy environment, and more as a 
result of global progress toward a technological frontier (affecting many countries 
simultaneously). 
Answer 2: The labour share of national income is falling because of 
the  increasing importance of the financial sector, often called financialisation. 
Using a large panel dataset, Dünhaupt shows that financialisation affected the 
distribution between wages on the one hand, and profits, retained earnings, 
dividends and interest payments on the other.14 Parham found that the finance and 
insurance sectors accounted for 44% of all multi-factor productivity growth over 
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the previous decade, while mining accounted for almost 40% of all input-increasing 
productivity.15 Neither activity tends to be associated with broad increases in wages 
or labour productivity. Finance tends to demonstrate relatively low employment 
intensity. Mining is associated, if anything, with capital-deepening productivity 
growth, not labour-augmenting productivity increases. 
For the Australian economy as a whole, with its large household borrowing 
and lending channel, and its highly advanced superannuation industry, the 
financialisation hypothesis is certainly worthy of further study. Westcott and 
Murray provide tentative evidence that financialisation is contributing to increases 
in inequality in Australia; Peetz also highlights financialisation as a crucial factor in 
the decline of the labour share of Australian output.16
Answer 3: Labour laws and the institutions of collective bargaining 
have changed in favour of employers in many industrial economies. Deakin 
and colleagues examined the link between labour laws and the labour share of 
national income. They found that worker‐protective labour laws in general have 
no consistent relationship with unemployment — which is far more likely to be 
affected by changes in the business cycle. Stronger protective labour laws were 
positively correlated with labour’s share of national income. Laws specifically 
relating to working time and employee representation had beneficial effects on 
both efficiency and distribution.17 
More recently, Adams and colleagues generalised this finding to 113 countries, 
and found the pattern holds that weaker labour laws coincide with negative shifts 
in labour shares of national income.18 The trend is particularly prevalent amongst 
middle-income workers in rich countries, and so would certainly apply to the 
Australian case. In the Australian context, and following an examination of wage 
and productivity trends, Isaac has suggested that weakening labour laws are at least 
partly to blame for Australia’s wage stagnation: 
The institutions that have in the past driven wages to take up productivity 
advances, have lost much of their capacity to influence wages. The bargaining 
power of organised labour has been weakened in a large section of the labour 
market. This has resulted, in good part, from changes in industrial relations 
laws that have progressively contributed to the imbalance of power.19
Productivity and inequality
Economic theory suggests that more productive workers can bid up their wages 
in competitive markets to get paid more. We should therefore expect to see wage 
increases following productivity growth, and hence wage stagnation would be 
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associated with a decline in productivity. However, in the Australian context, the 
two series diverge — and by more than in other rich countries. 
Indexed to the year 2000, Australian real wages increased by 13.7% over the 
17-year period to 2017, while labour productivity rose by 26.2% over the same 
period.20 What explains this divergence (or decoupling)? Using the UK and the US 
as exemplars of the more general trend, Pessoa and Van Reenen suggest two main 
factors behind this divergence:
1. the wedge between total compensation (which includes employer-
provided benefits like superannuation and health insurance) and 
money wages received by workers, with the former growing faster than 
the latter. This wedge pushes better-paid workers’ total compensation 
higher than less well paid workers
2. differences in producer-wages and consumption-wages.21 From the 
perspective of workers’ purchasing power, wages (deflated by consumer 
prices) may seem lower than from the perspective of employers (who 
evaluate wages relative to output or producer prices). 
Figure 3.2 shows the evolution of incomes in terms of percentile ratios, 
grouped as deciles. We are looking for a measure of the changes in relative income 
inequality by income class. If a compensation wedge exists, we should expect to see 
increases in income inequality as better-off workers absorb greater increases in total 
compensation relative to less well-off workers. This is the simplest way to check 
Pessoa and Van Reenen’s first hypothesis. One simple measure of inequality is the 
ratio of incomes between higher and lower deciles of the population. For example, 
the 90/10 ratio measures the income of an individual at the 90th percentile (that 
is, receiving more income than 90% of the population) with someone at the 10th 
percentile. The 90/50 ratio expresses the income of someone at the 90th percentile 
relative to the median (that is, someone at the 50th percentile), while the 50/10 
ratio expresses the median household income as a multiple of the 10th percentile.
If Pessoa and Van Reenen’s hypothesis is correct, we should expect to see 
large divergences by income group over time. Figure 3.2 shows the evolution of 
three inequality ratios (90/10, 90/50, and 50/10) for Australia.22 The ratio between 
the gross incomes of households at the 90th percentile — among the highest-
earning households in Australia — and the median household increased steadily 
from around 1.7 in 1975 to over 2 in 2017. The 90/10 ratio increased more 
dramatically over the same period, from 2.6 to 3.4 (a nearly one-third increase). 
Meanwhile, the ratio between the median household and the poorest households 
barely changed over a 45-year period. This suggests that most of the growth in 
inequality has been driven by growing incomes at the top of the distribution; those 
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are the same households that receive a disproportionate share of capital income. 
Hence inequality in income growth is clearly associated with the significant decline 
in the labour share of income.
The wedge between compensation and wages is likely to be especially 
significant for higher-income households, given their disproportionate access to 
more generous superannuation benefits, health insurance and other fringe benefits. 
In this context, the growing inequality between high-income households and the 
Figure 3.2: Evolution of gross income inequality measures over time
Source: OECD stat, from LFS database (Dataset code=DEC_I).
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rest of Australian society is likely associated with that wedge, though a deeper 
analysis would be required to fully assess that claim. 
The second factor hypothesised by Pessoa and Van Reenan is the difference 
between the consumer real wage and the producer real wage. The consumer 
real wage is based on a deflation of wages by consumer prices; the producer 
real wage uses a weighted-average price of output (such as the GDP deflator) to 
adjust nominal wages. The two series will diverge to the extent that consumer 
and producer price indices differ over time.23 However, a comparison of the two 
price indices over time does not reveal any sustained or consistent differences. At 
times, output prices rise much faster or slower than consumer prices, typically as a 
result of large swings in global prices for Australian-produced resource exports. But 
over the long run, the two series have followed a similar trajectory. It is unlikely, 
therefore, that the second hypothesis regarding producer versus consumer wages 
will explain Australia’s wage trajectory. Something else is driving the divergence 
between wages and productivity.
Income inequality is driving at least some of the divergence, with higher-
income households absorbing a growing share of total income. There are important 
compositional effects to consider as well. In 1975, low-paid workers — those 
workers who earn less than two-thirds of the median wage — made up about 
11% of the workforce. By 2012, the low-paid were 19% of the workforce.24 Before 
locating the source of rising inequality, the question then becomes: What is (or is 
not) driving productivity? 
It is also important to place worker productivity levels in their international 
context. Figure 3.3 shows the evolution of labour productivity for Australia and 
selected rich countries. This measure of labour productivity is calculated using 
data on GDP in constant 2005 US dollars, corrected for purchasing power parity, 
derived from the World Development Indicators database of the World Bank. 
To compute labour productivity as GDP per worker, ILO estimates for total 
employment are used. Using the figures from this chart, we can see that Australian 
employers have enjoyed relatively strong productivity growth relative to other rich 
countries, with a 38% increase relative to the year 2000. The average of all high-
income countries was a 22% increase in labour productivity. 
Some of Australia’s relatively strong productivity growth is attributable to 
the mining boom of the mid-2000s. Labour productivity has also grown strongly 
in the agriculture, forestry and fishing sectors. Still more is attributable to the fact 
that Australia weathered the GFC more successfully than comparator countries.25 
However, Australian wages have not kept pace even with average wage growth 
for other rich economies, let alone with the superior growth in productivity 
experienced here over the recent period. 
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One possible factor alluded to above is technological change. Perhaps 
technological change is causing workers to lose out relative to the owners of 
capital, especially when significant numbers of jobs can be automated away. Yet 
Dolman finds that Australia has been a laggard in technological change relative to 
other advanced economies.26 Perhaps a closer examination of the dimensions and 
pace of innovation and productivity growth in the Australian context would shed 
additional light.
Figure 3.3: Labour productivity, indexed to the year 2000
Source: ILO stat. Labour productivity measured as output per worker in units of GDP in constant 
2010 US dollars, indexed to the year 2000. Latest release data are used for May 2018..
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One common measure of technological change is total factor productivity, 
which is approximated by that portion of output not explained by the quantity 
of inputs used in production (such as labour and capital). The level of total factor 
productivity thus reflects how efficiently, and with what intensity, inputs like land, 
labour and capital are combined and utilised in the many production processes 
that make up an economy. It should be stressed that total factor productivity is 
only one indicator of efficiency. Bergeaud and colleagues have computed long-run 
measurements of total factor productivity from 1890 to 2012 for many countries, 
including Australia and the Euro-area.27 They found that, in the post-war era, 
Australia has typically been at about 80% of US total factor productivity. The US 
is commonly assumed to be at, or near, the technological frontier in most sectors. 
Technical change, should it occur, most often occurs in the US first. In that case, 
workers should expect to see changes in US workforce before they see changes in 
the Australian workforce, and Dolman’s hypothesis has at least some support.28 
Bergeaud et al’s computation of Australia’s total factor productivity and 
labour productivity levels shows that Australia has traditionally been well below 
corresponding measures in Europe and the US, but that Australia caught up very 
rapidly in the post-war era. Productivity levels rose very rapidly during the post-
war decades until the 1990s, when a policy-induced structural break occurred.29 
Trend productivity growth has been slower in the decades since then. 
Moreover, a recent Productivity Commission inquiry suggested that virtually 
all of the labour productivity growth that was experienced in Australia between 
2003/04 and 2015/16 came from capital deepening, and almost none from 
improved multifactor productivity. Capital deepening results from increased 
investment in capital goods (such as plant, equipment and automation), most likely 
associated with strong investment in mining and agriculture.30 No acceleration of 
labour productivity growth was noted, despite the strong investment rates.
Labour productivity also depends on capacity utilisation. When production 
facilities are less than fully utilised, productivity levels are unlikely to be optimised. 
Capacity utilisation levels in Australia have certainly recovered from the nadir of 
the GFC, and labour productivity has improved commensurately, but wage growth 
remains subdued. We can therefore remove capacity utilisation issues as the source 
of the lack of wage growth.
Population and unionisation
Another assumption often made in relation to the presence of inequality of income 
and levels of unionisation is that ‘size matters’. In other words, countries with smaller 
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populations, such as Australia, can be expected to have lower rates of unionisation, 
and therefore greater wage inequality, than countries with larger populations.31 
Australia’s population is small relative to its landmass. Despite this, the 
population is exceptionally urbanised relative to OECD countries. It is also, as 
shown above, moderately unequal in both income and wealth distributions. The 
Figure 3.4: Gross Income inequality and union density, scaled by population 
Source: OECD income distribution database (IDD), Population Database (POP), and Union 
membership database (TUD).
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wealth share held by the top 1% of households in Australia has been growing 
almost continuously over the past two decades. The wealth share held by the 
poorest 50% of Australians has been falling almost continuously over the same 
period. How much of this has to do with changes in population?
Figure 3.4 shows a scatter plot of the Gini coefficient — a measure of income 
inequality where a lower value indicates a more equal society — and union density. 
To take account of changes in income inequality caused by the great financial 
crisis, we average the coefficients over a 10-year period from 2004 to 2014. We 
do the same with union density. The size of each country bubble represents the 
population of the country, in millions of people.
We note three clear relationships from Figure 3.4. First, countries with higher 
income inequality tend to be associated with lower levels of union representation. 
Second, the lower quadrant is associated with social democratic, Nordic countries. 
Third, population size seems to have no bearing on union density and inequality. 
It is possible for countries to have a low level of union membership, but 
relatively high levels of collective agreement coverage (this is the case, for example, 
in France). Figure 3.5 is a slopegraph which measures the level of collective wage 
determination by the proportion of workers covered by collective agreements. 
Figure 3.5 compares changes over a 50-year period in bargaining coverage for six 
selected countries. Australia is highlighted in red. The figure includes both union-
negotiated collective agreements at the workplace or sectoral level, but also the 
coverage provided by statutory sector- or economy-wide agreements. The latter are 
especially important in Australia’s history, because of the dominant role played by 
the award system in setting benchmarks for wages and other terms and conditions 
across most of the economy. Figure 3.5 confirms the striking decline of collective 
agreement coverage in Australia. From near-universal coverage in the early post-
war period, Australia’s collective agreement coverage fell gradually through the 
1960s and 1970s, and then more precipitously in the 1990s — coinciding with 
the thorough restructuring of Australian labour law based on neoliberal principles, 
including the expanding scope for individual employment contracts. This is 
precisely the moment Bergeaud and colleagues identify as the structural break in 
Australian labour productivity and wage growth data.32 The only other country to 
experience declines in collective agreement coverage of comparable magnitude is 
the UK, where it declined from 72% to roughly 30% over the same period. The 
influence of active policy choices is also apparent in the UK case, with the most 
dramatic decline beginning in the 1980s as the anti-union policies of the Thatcher 
government came into force. 
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Conclusion
This chapter has considered three hypotheses for wage stagnation in Australia on 
the basis of internationally comparative data.
The first hypothesis centred on whether the decoupling of wage growth and 
labour productivity was related to the influence of globalisation or technological 
change. The evidence for this hypothesis is mixed; more study in an Australian 
context is required. 
Figure 3.5: Slopegraph of bargaining coverage, percentage of workforce
Source: OECD Database on Union Coverage (TUD).
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The second hypothesis considered whether financialisation was responsible 
for wage stagnation and hence increasing income inequality. There is some evidence 
for this viewpoint, given Australia’s highly financialised economy, but again, more 
evidence is required.
The third hypothesis centred on the erosion of workers’ collective bargaining 
rights. Here more conclusive evidence was found, both with respect to union 
density and bargaining coverage.
The decoupling of wage growth from labour productivity is almost certainly 
affected by globalisation and technological change, but these ‘megatrends’ 
are to some extent out of Australian policy makers’ control. The influence of 
financialisation is within domestic policy makers’ purview, but quite difficult to 
solve as a positive policy problem (given factors such as the concentrated influence 
of the major banks, the scale of the superannuation industry, and the high 
indebtedness of the household sector). 
All this suggests that the erosion of workers’ rights is the most consequential, 
and actionable, factor behind the stagnation of wages in Australia, and the 
corresponding growth of income inequality and decline in labour’s share of 
national income. Our analysis indicates that this erosion seems closely related to 
policy choices made here (with a particular shift in policy evident in the 1990s); 
the relationship between the evolution of policy and the trajectory of Australian 
wages is explored further by other chapters in this volume. By implication, if the 
stagnation of wages, the decline in labour’s share of GDP and the break between 
real wage growth and productivity growth all reflect the effects of past policy 
choices, then those variables should be amenable to alternative policy choices 
today. Therefore, if the erosion of workers’ bargaining rights and other institutional 
supports for wages can be arrested and ameliorated (and this should be possible, 
and relatively quickly), the international experience suggests that this would likely 
have a positive impact on wage levels and growth rates. 
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